State v. Beck Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 42989 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-2-2015
State v. Beck Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42989
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Beck Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42989" (2015). Not Reported. 2217.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2217
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 










BLAINE COUNTY NO. CR 2014-467 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BLAINE 
HONORABLE JONATHAN BRODY 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6661 
P .0. Box 2816 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




FIL D · COPY 
OCT O 2 2015 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......... . ..... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................ .. . ...... 1 
Nature of the Case........ . . . ... . .. . . .... ...... .. ...... .. . . . .. ................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings... . .. .. ............................................................ 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL......... .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . . . .. . 3 
ARGUMENT ...... ...................... ...... .. .. .. . ................................................................ 4 
Requiring Mr. Beck To Register As A Sex Offender By Operation Of 
LC.§ 18-8304 Deprives Him Of His Right To Equal Protection Of Law .................. .4 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4 
B. Idaho Code§ 18-8304 Deprives Mr. Beck Equal Protection Because 
The Statute Requires Him To Register As A Sex-Offender Where 18 
Year Olds Convicted Of Non-Forcible Rape Are Not Required To 
Register . ......... .......... ..... ...... .. ........................................................ 4 
1. The Classification Under Attack Is 18 Year-Olds Convicted Of 
Non-Forcible, Sexually Related Activity... .. .... . .. . .. ..... ..... . . .. . ...................... 5 
2 The Rational Basis Test Is The Appropriate Standard Of Review ................... 7 
3. The Discriminatory Character Of I.C. § 18-8304 Is Not Rationally 
Related To Any Legitimate Legislative Purpose ............................................ 8 
CONCLUSION.................. . .. . . .. . . . .. .. . .. . .. .................................................................... 9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ...................................................................................... 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct App. 1999) ................................... .4 
Barbierv. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L Ed. 923 (1885) .................. .4 
Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State Dep't of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002 
(1989) ......................... ··········· ................................................................... 4 
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388 (1999) ............................... 8 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ........................................................ 5 
Kerrv. Dep'tof Employment, 97 Idaho 385 (1976) ............................................ 5 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 
(1911) ..................................................................................................... 4 
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 
L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).. .... .. ............................................................... 5 
Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351 ( 1990)................... . ...................... .4 
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 
(1949) ........................................................................................... 5 
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96 (1999) ................................................................... 8 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920) 5 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827 (2001) .......................................................... 5, 7 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41 (Ct. App. 2003) .................................................. .4 
State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751 ............................................................. 7 
Statutes 
I.C. § 18-1509A ............................................................................. 1, 5, 6 
II 
I C § 18-61 01 ( 1 ) .. . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. . 
§ 18-6108(1). 
. ............................................... ······ .... . 6 
.... .. ..... . . .. . .. ... . . ......... ..6 
LC. § 18-8301 .. . ................ . 4, 8 
1.C. § 18-8302 .......... . .. .. ......... ... ..8 
I.C. § 18-8304 ........................ . . ............... ............... passim 
I.C. § 18-8331 ................................................................................................ . 4 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
18 year-old Riley Beck sent messages to girls he knew who were under the age 
of 16, asking them if they wanted to engage in sexual activity with him. Mr. Beck pied 
guilty to three counts of enticing a child through the use of the internet, pursuant to 
LC. § 18-1509A, and by operation of LC. § 18-8304, he is required to register as a sex 
offender. However, the same statute that requires him to register as a sex offender 
exempts 18 year-olds who are convicted of non-forcible rape or male rape. Mr. Beck 
appeals the district court's order denying his motion for an order exempting him from 
being required to register as a sex offender. He asserts that the operation of LC. § 18-
8304 violates his right to equal protection by failing to provide him the same registration 
exemption as it provides 18 year-olds convicted of non-forcible rape. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged 18 year-old Riley Beck with one count of sexual exploitation of 
a child, five counts of enticing a child through the use of the internet, and one count of 
disseminating material harmful to minors. (R., pp.77-84.) Pursuant to an agreement 
with the State, Mr. Beck pied guilty to three counts of enticing a child through the 
internet, as alleged in an amended information, and reserved his right to appeal any 
adverse ruling from his forthcoming motion asking the court to exempt him from having 
to register as a sex offender; in exchange, the State agreed to recommend no more 
than a unified term of 15 years, with seven years fixed, and for the court to retain 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.107-112.) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Beck filed a motion requesting the district court to enter 
an order exempting him from having to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.119-127.) 
1 
Mr. Beck argued that the registration statute, I.C. § 18-8304, violated his right to equal 
protection in that it required him to register as a sex offender for soliciting girls under the 
age of 16 to engage in sexual activity with him, while it exempts 18 year-old males who 
accomplish acts of penile penetration with girls (or boys) under the age of 16 from the 
registration requirement. Id. The State filed an objection to Mr. Beck's motion and the 
district court heard arguments from the parties during the sentencing hearing. 
(R., pp.128-137; Tr. Sent, p.27, L.18 - p.50, L.1.) The district court denied Mr. Beck's 
motion. 1 (R., pp.151-155.) Mr. Beck filed a Notice of Appeal timely from his judgment 
of conviction. 2 (R., pp.144-148, 156-159.) 
1 The issue presented in this appeal is a question of law; therefore, while Mr. Beck 
seeks relief from the district court's ruling, neither his appellate argument nor this 
Court's decision is dependent upon or beholden to the district court's findings. 
2 The district court imposed a unified term of 15 years, with 7 years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.144-150.) Because the district court did not exceed the State's 
recommendation, Mr. Beck waived his right to challenge his sentence. (Tr. Plea, p.16, 
L.14- p.18, L.6.) 
2 
ISSUE 
requmng Mr. Beck to register as a sex offender by operation I. § 18-8304 
him of his right to equal protect of law? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
Requiring Mr. Beck To Register As A Sex Offender By Operation Of I.C. § 18-8304 
Deprives Him Of His Right To Equal Protection Of Law 
A. Introduction 
Idaho Code § 18-8304 imposes upon most people who have been convicted of 
sex crimes the burden of registering as a sex offender, and the attendant obligations 
and limitations on their liberty. See I.C. §§ 18-8301-18-8331. Exempted from this 
requirement are 18 year-old males who commit either non-forcible rape, or non-forcible 
male rape. Mr. Beck, himself an 18-year old male, committed the non-forcible crime of 
enticing a child over the internet; however, LC. § 18-8304 does not exempt him of the 
burden of having to register as a sex offender. Mr. Beck asserts that this disparate 
treatment deprives him of his right to equal protection of the laws. 
B. Idaho Code § 18-8304 Deprives Mr. Beck Equal Protection Because The Statute 
Requires Him To Register As A Sex-Offender Where 18 Year Olds Convicted Of 
Non-Forcible Rape Are Not Required To Register 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 2 of 
the Idaho Constitution guarantee equal protection of the law. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 
41, 51 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351,357 (1990)). 
'The principle underlying equal protection is that all persons in like circumstances 
should receive the same benefits and burdens of the law." Id. (citing Bon Appetit 
Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State Dep't of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 1003 (1989); 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,401 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed, 
(T)he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat 
different classes of persons in different ways. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 
U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911 ); Railway Express 
4 
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949); 
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 
1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). The Equal Protection Clause of that 
amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that 
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of 
that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation 
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S 412, 415, 
40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). 
Kerr v. Dep't of Employment, 97 Idaho 385. 386 (1976) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 446-447 (1972). "Equal protection claims require a three-step analysis: the 
reviewing court must first, identify the classification under attack; second, determine the 
standard under which the classification will be reviewed; and third, determine whether 
the standard has been satisfied. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
1. The Classification Under Attack Is 18 Year-Olds Convicted Of Non-
Forcible, Sexually Related Activity 
Mr. Beck asserts that the classification at issue in his case is 18 year-olds who 
have been convicted of non-forcible, sexually related activity.3 Pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 18-1509A(1 ), 
A person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony if 
such person knowingly uses the internet or any device that provides 
transmission of messages, signals, facsimiles, video images or other 
communication to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or 
actions, or both, a person under the age of sixteen (16) years or a 
person the defendant believes to be under the age of sixteen (16) years to 
3 Mr. Beck uses the term "non-forcible, sexually related activity" in this Brief to describe 
situations where either the victim gave their de facto consent to the activity, though they 
are by law deemed incapable of giving legal consent, or where sexual activity is 
solicited but not engaged in, from situations where sexual activity is actually forced upon 
the victim or the de facto consent was the result of intoxication or other infirmity not 
related to the victim's age. The focus of the inquiry should be on the activities engaged 
in by the offender in light of the mental and physical status of their victim. 
5 
engage in any sexual act with or against the person where such act would 
be a violation of chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 18-1509A(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Idaho Code§ 18-6101(1) defines rape 
as, "the penetration, however slight, oral, anal or vaginal opening with 
perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female [w]here the female is under the age 
of sixteen (16) years and the perpetrator is eighteen (18) years of age or older." 
I.C. § 18-6101(1). Similar language appears in the statute defining the crime of male 
rape. See I.C. § 18-6108(1). All of these statutes apply to anyone who is 18 years or 
older who engages in certain, non-forcible, sexually related activities with those under 
16 years of age.4 
Idaho Code § 18-8304 requires people convicted of certain sexual-related 
crimes, including enticing a child through the internet or similar means in violation of 
I.C. §§ 18-1509A to register as a sex offender. I.C. §18-8304. However, the statute 
specifically exempts 18 year-olds who are convicted of non-forcible rape, pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-6101(1), and non-forcible male rape, pursuant I.C. § 18-6108(1), from the 
registration requirement. Thus, while an 18 year-old who entices a child under 16 years 
of age to participate in a sexual act through the internet, and an 18 year-old who, 
without the use of force, penetrates the oral, anal or vaginal opening of a child under 16 
years of age, are both subject to criminal prosecution and conviction, the former is 
required to register as a sex-offender, while the latter is exempt from that burden. 
Mr. Beck asserts that the legislature's disparate treatment of similarly culpable 18 year-
4 Of course, by the plain language of the statutes, only males can commit rape and 
male rape, while any person can commit the crime of enticing a child through the 
internet. Because Mr. Beck is himself male, he does not raise any gender based 
challenges to the statutory scheme. 
6 
olds creates a classification subject to an equal protection challenge. 5 
2. The Rational Basis Test Is The Appropriate Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has observed, 
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny applies to 
fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny applies to 
classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny 
applies to all other challenges. For analyses made under the Idaho 
Constitution, slightly different levels of scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as 
under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes. 
Means-focus scrutiny, unlike federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed 
"where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification 
is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of lack 
of relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the 
statute." Rational basis scrutiny appiies to all other challenges. 
Harl, 135 Idaho at 830 (quoting State v. Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 754-55 (2000)). 
Mr. Beck recognizes that he does not belong to a suspect class. Furthermore, although 
the discriminatory character of the challenged classification is apparent on the face of 
the statute and there is an apparent lack of a relationship between the classification and 
the purported purpose of the statute. because the statute does not distinguish between 
individuals or groups in either "odiously'' or in a manner ·calculated to excite animosity 
or ill will," see id., ML Beck acknowledges that the rational basis test is the appropriate 
standard of review. 
5 Mr. Beck recognizes that an 18 year-old who engages in de facto consensual lewd 
and lascivious conduct would have the same equal protection argument he has brought 
forth; however, his ultimate claim here is as at was in the district court: "There is no 
rational reason for the Legislature to exempt eighteen-year-olds who complete an act of 
consensual sexual intercourse yet make that same person register for life because he 
used a text message to 'persuade,' 'seduce' or 'entice' the female to engage in that act, 
without success." (R., p.124.) 
7 
3. The Discriminatory Character Of I.C. § 18-8304 Is Not Rationally Related 
To Any Legitimate Legislative Purpose 
"A classification will survive rationai basis review if the classification is rationally 
related to a legitimate legislative purpose." Id. (citing Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 396 (1999). "The meaning and effect of a statute is a 
question of law over which [an appellate] Court exercises free review." Id. 135 Idaho at 
829 (2001) (citations omitted). 
The legislature adopted the "Sex Offender Registration Notification and 
Community Right-to-Know Act" in 1998. I.C. § 18-8301. Lest there be any doubt of its 
intentions, the legislature provided its reasons for doing so: 
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and that 
efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct 
investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sexual 
offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available about 
individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live within 
their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing public access 
to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists parents in 
the protection of their children. Such access further provides a means for 
organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable populations to 
prevent sexual offenders from threatening those served by the 
organizations. Finally, public access assists the community in being 
observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from 
recommitting sexual crimes. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist 
efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by 
requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies 
and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the 
public as provided in this chapter. 
I.C. § 18-8302. In short, in order to provide the police and public with information the 
legislature deems useful in preventing convicted sex offenders from committing 
additional sexual offenses, the legislature adopted the registration scheme at issue in 
the present case. The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this scheme as regulatory, 
not punitive. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101 (1999). 
8 
While requiring individuals convicted of sex crimes, as opposed to say drug 
crimes, to register with the State serves a legitimate purpose, the discriminatory 
character of the challenged classification in this case serves no such purpose. Simply 
put, Idaho treats 18 year-olds (specifically 18 year-old males), who penetrate the oral, 
anal or vaginal opening of a person under 16, differently than Idaho treats 18-year-olds 
who solicit, but don't accomplish, these and similar acts through the use of modern 
technology. No legitimate State interest is served by exempting 18 year-olds who 
accomplish the specific sexual act through non-forcible means from registering as a sex 
offender, while not providing that same exemption for those 18 years of age who merely 
solicit their victim to participate in such actions. 
Thus, requiring Riley Beck to register as a sex offender would deprive him of his 
right to equal protection of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Beck respectfully requests that this Court declare that operation of I.C. § 18-
8304 acts to deprive him of his right to equal protection, and to remand his case to the 
district court with instructions for that court to issue an injunction barring all executive 
branch officials from requiring him to register as a sex offender, or for whatever relief 
this Court deems just. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2015. 
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